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BOLZANO VERSUS KANT: MATHEMATICS AS A SCIENTIA
UNIVERSALIS
PAOLA CANTU`
Abstract. The paper will discuss some changes in Bolzano’s definition of
mathematics attested in several quotations from the Beytra¨ge, Wissenschaft-
slehre and Gro¨ssenlehre: is mathematics a theory of forms or a theory of quan-
tities? Several issues that are maintained throughout Bolzano’s works will be
distinguished from others that were accepted in the Beytra¨ge and abandoned
in the Gro¨ssenlehre. Changes will be interpreted as a consequence of the new
logical theory of truth introduced in the Wissenschaftslehre, but also as a
consequence ot the overcome of Kant’s terminology, and of the radicalization
of Bolzano’s anti-Kantianism. It will be argued that Bolzano’s evolution can
be understood as a coherent move, if one compares the criticism expressed
in the Beytra¨ge on the notion of quantity with a different and larger notion
of quantity that Bolzano developed already in 1816. This discussion is based
on the discovery that two unknown texts mentioned by Bolzano can be iden-
tified with works by von Spaun and Vieth respectively. Bolzano’s evolution
will be interpreted as a radicalization of the criticism of the Kantian defini-
tion of mathematics and as an effect of Bolzano’s unaltered interest in the
Leibnizian notion of mathesis universalis. As a conclusion, it will be argued
that Bolzano never abandoned his original idea of considering mathematics as
a scientia universalis, i.e. as the science of quantities in general, and it will
be suggested that the question of ideal elements in mathematics, which has
been interpreted as a main reason for the development of a new logical theory,
can also be considered as a main reason for developing a different definition of
quantity.
1. Introduction
It is well known that Bolzano, after having criticized in the Beytra¨ge the tradi-
tional definition of mathematics as a theory of quantities,1 and suggested an alter-
native characterization as a theory of forms, went back to the traditional definition
This paper was first presented at the International Conference Philosophy and Mathematics in the
Work of Bernard Bolzano that took place in Prague on April 15-18, 2010. A section of the paper
was developed and presented at the 9th National Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic
Philosophy Truth, Knowledge, and Science held at the University of Padua on September 23-25,
2010. I thank the participants for their valuable remarks and comments.
1For a discussion of the origin and development of the so-called ‘traditional’ definition of mathe-
matics, see Cantu` [2003b, chap. 3].
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in the Gro¨ssenlehre. This paper aims at understanding why Bolzano changed his
mind, and what effect this change had on his conception of mathematics.
Firstly, I will claim that Bolzano’s return to the definition of mathematics as a
science of quantities was not a U-turn (§ 2), because there are several essential issues
that were maintained throughout all his writings. Bolzano was always convinced
that mathematics cannot be restricted to the study of numbers and magnitudes (§
2.1), because he never abandoned the idea that the definition of mathematics should
not be based on a domain of objects: he always preferred other definitional criteria,
such as a sharp distinction with respect to other forms of knowledge (philosophy,
logic, other scientific disciplines), or methodological considerations. Bolzano did
not renounce to the idea that mathematics is a truly conceptual science (§ 2.2),
nor did he change his mind concerning the fact that mathematical treatises include
both analytic and synthetic propositions (§ 2.3).
Secondly, I will present some relevant changes that might support the claim that
Bolzano’s notion of mathematics did nonetheless undergo a significant evolution
from 1810 to 1848, as already evident in the fact that he switched from the definition
of mathematics as a theory of forms (Formenlehre) to a definition of mathematics
as a theory of quantities (Gro¨ssenlehre) (§ 3.1). The development of the theory
of ideas in themselves induced him to abandon the belief that mathematics should
concern the conditions for the possibility of existence, because he remarked that
mathematics could concern also ideas in themselves, which are not and cannot
become actual (§ 3.3). In the Gro¨ssenlehre Bolzano considered any definition that
could introduce a sharp distinction between mathematics and other sciences as
unattainable (§ 3.2). Besides, he gave a different evaluation of the role of analytic
propositions in the Beytra¨ge and in the Wissenschaftslehre, which might be partly
explained as a result of a change in the understanding of the notion of analyticity
(§ 3.4). As a result, Bolzano became even more anti-Kantian than before (§ 3.5).
Thirdly, the apparent contradiction between the definitions suggested in the
Beytra¨ge and in the Gro¨ssenlehre will be explained on the basis of an enlargement
of the notion of quantity (Gro¨ße)2 that Bolzano suggested already in 1816 (§ 4).
The analysis will be based on the discovery that two unknown texts mentioned by
Bolzano can be identified with works by von Spaun and Vieth respectively.
Finally, I will suggest two reasons why Bolzano altered certain features of his
conception of mathematics and not others: his mathematical anti-Kantianism and
2In the following I will use the term ‘quantity’ to translate ‘Gro¨ße’, which corresponds to the
Euclidean term ‘me´ghezos’. ‘Quantity’ is thus distinguished from ‘size’ that corresponds to ‘pe-
likote´s’ (see e.g. Klein [1934-36, p. 173]). I preferrred ‘quantity’ to ‘magnitude’, because the
latter has acquired a very specific meaning in contemporary English, but also because Bolzano
himself translates ‘Gro¨sse’ with the latin term ‘quantitas’, as in Wolff, rather than with the term
‘magnitudo’ that was used in some Latin editions of Euclid’s Elements. For a detailed analysis of
the history of the terms, see Cantu` [2003b, pp. 80–86].
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the new logical theory developed in the Wissenschaftslehre. The changes mentioned
in § 3 will be explained as a side-effect of the theory of ideas in themselves, but also
as a further move against Kant. The continuity elements discussed in § 2 will be
considered as reasons for defending the coherence of Bolzano’s evolution and will be
interpreted as aspects of his unaltered understanding of mathematics as a scientia
universalis.
2. Continuity: four never abandoned features of mathematics
2.1. Mathematical objects are not just quantities. In the first chapter of the
Beytra¨ge, Bolzano contrasted Euclid’s lack of a definition of mathematics, and the
traditional definition that can be found in contemporary textbooks:
It is well known that the oldest mathematical textbook, Euclid’s
Elements—which in some ways is still unsurpassed—contains no
definition of the science with which it is concerned. Whether its
immortal author did this out of a kind of willfulness, or because
he thought it was not worthwhile, or because he did not know
any valid definition to give us, I shall not venture to decide. By
contrast, in all modern textbooks of mathematics this definition is
put forward: ‘mathematics is the science of quantity ’. Kant has
already found fault with this definition in his Kritik der reinen
Vernunft (see the 2nd edition, p. 742) because in it, as he says,
‘no essential characteristic of mathematics is stated, and the effect
is also mistaken for the cause.’3
Similar criticism of the traditional definition of mathematics was quite common
among German-speaking philosophers: Kant, Hegel and after him Grassmann crit-
icized the definition of mathematics as Gro¨ssenlehre. This is partly due to the fact
that Wolff, introducing a German terminology for mathematics and philosophy in
his Mathematisches Lexicon, had translated several distinct notions—moles, volu-
men, quantitas, magnitudo—by the same word: ‘Gro¨ße’.4 Bolzano’s rejection of
the traditional definition begins by a mention of Kant’s earlier critical remarks.
This is something more than an argument ad auctoritatem. Bolzano agrees with
Kant’s objection: a satisfactory definition of mathematics should not be based on
3Cf. Beytra¨ge § 1, in Russ [2004, p. 91].
4For a detailed analysis of Wolff’s contribution to the unification of the concept of magnitude and
quantity in German terminology, see Cantu` [2008]. The paper suggests that Wolff’s terminological
confusion, together with the heritage of the Latin translations by Euclid which had used the two
terms magnitudo and quantitas to translate the Greek term “me´gezos” might explain why so many
German speaking philosophers and mathematicians questioned the meaning of the term Gro¨ße:
e.g. Euler, Gauss, Kant, Hegel, Bolzano, Grassmann.
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its domain—i.e. quantities. While Kant argues that such a definition is inade-
quate because it mistakes the effect for the cause, and gives an explanation of why
mathematics applies to quantities, Bolzano claims on the contrary that the defini-
tion is unsatisfactory because the domain of mathematics does not coincide with
quantities; besides, the notion of quantity is not univocally determined.
Bolzano’s criticism is expressed in § 2 of the Beytra¨ge, where he quotes an anony-
mous work Versuch, das Studium der Mathematik durch Erla¨uterung einiger Grund-
begriffe und durch zweckma¨ssigere Methoden zu erleichtern, published by Go¨bhardt
in Mamberg und Wu¨rzburg 1805 (see Spaun [1805]). It is presumably a reprint of a
book also published anonymously by Go¨bhardt in 1804 Versuch einer Begriffe der
Mathematik zu erla¨utern und zu bestimmen. I suggest that the author, not iden-
tified until now, could well be Franz Ritter von Spaun, who after having worked
for several years in the Austrian administration, was condamned for a writing that
was considered politically dangerous, and from 1788 onwards, expecially during the
ten years he passed in prison, devoted himself to mathematics.5 The text quoted
by Bolzano contains a criticism of negative quantities, and was reviewed in the
Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung by an anonymous reviewer “B.”.6 The au-
thor, like Bolzano, argues that the objects of mathematics are neither quantities
in the sense of conceivable entities, nor quantities in the sense of sensible objects.
Bolzano quotes again the book in the Erste Begriffe der allgemeinen Gro¨ßenlehre,
where he repeats what he had already declared in the Beytra¨ge, that is to say, that
not every quantity need be real ( i.e. wirklich) or wahrnehmbar, given that even
space and time (to which quantities are often applied) are not real, nor can they
be perceived.7 In both occasions Bolzano quotes the author’s definition of quantity
as something that exists and can be perceived by some sense.
Naturally everything here depends on what is understood by the
word ‘quantity ’. The anonymous author of the book Versuch, das
Studium der Mathematik durch Erla¨uterung einiger Grundbegriffe
und durch zweckma¨ssigere Methoden zu erleichtern. Bamberg and
Wu¨rzburg, 1805 (S. 4), puts forward the following definition of
5Von Spaun wrote several other mathematical books, including Briefe u¨ber die erste Grundsa¨tze
der Mechanik (1807), Einleitung zur geometrischen Construction aller Probleme der spha¨rischen
Trigonometrie (1811), Anleitung zur geradlinigen Trigonometrie (1818), Mein mathematisches
Instrument (1825), but was also well-known for his radical criticism of Goethe’s poetry.
6Cf. Anonymous [1807]. It would be interesting to verify whether the author could not be Bolzano
himself.
7‘Alles was ist und durch irgend einen Sinn wahrgenommen werden kann, ist eine Gro¨ße.’ Ich wa¨re
dagegen der Meinung, daß nicht jede Gro¨ße etwas Reales (wenn dieses soviel als etwas Wirkliches
bedeuten soll) um so weniger etwas sinnlich Wahrnehmbares seyn mu¨sse; ja ich glaube, daß nicht
einmal Zeit und Raum (auf welche der Begriff der Gro¨ßen doch ganz vornehmlich angewandt wird)
etwas Wirkliches und sinnlich Wahnehmbares seyen.” Erste Begriffe der allgemeinen Gro¨ßenlehre,
in Bolzano [1975, p. 224].
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quantity, ‘A quantity is something that exists and can be perceived
by some sense.’ This definition is always one of two things, either
too wide or too narrow, according to whether the author takes the
words ‘exists’ and ‘can be perceived ’ in their widest sense when they
mean a purely ideal existence and a possibility of being thought, or
in their narrower and proper sense in which they hold only for a sen-
sible object which actually exists. In the first case, quantity would
be every conceivable thing without exception and if we then defined
mathematics as the science of quantity we would basically bring all
sciences into the domain of this one science. On the other hand,
in the second case, only sensible objects would be quantities, and
the domain of mathematics would obviously then be excessively
restricted—because immaterial things, e.g. spirits and spiritual
forces, can also become an object of mathematics, and particularly
of arithmetic.8
A deeper attention to other parts of the work of von Spaun shows that it aimed
at solving mathematical controversies, for example the question of negative quan-
tities, by means of a new definition of the concepts involved. Spaun claims that if
quantities are things that can be perceived, one should then be able to perceive and
determine distinctions between things, provided one has abstracted from all partic-
ularities: two things can then be distinguished either according to their succession
[Reihe] or to their position [Lage]. The first is an algebraic approach, the latter a
mathematical approach, because mathematics is a species of algebra (calculus): if
one makes abstraction from position, then two things are still different according
to their succession.9
Bolzano assumes the general notion of quantity, something that is composed
of equal parts, or something that can be determined by means of numbers,10 and
opposes it to a different notion of quantity (called here form), which amounts to
something that is given, and that can be distinguished from other given things by
means of position and/or succession, as it was suggested in the mentioned work
by von Spaun. This means that mathematics cannot be restricted to the study of
numerability. So, in some sense, the main reason why Bolzano refuses the traditional
definition is because it is not applicable to all kinds of thing, as mathesis generalis
should be, but rather introduces restrictive constraints.
Bolzano argues that the objects of mathematics are not “ the objects to which the
concept of quantity is especially applicable” either, because in that case all sciences,
8Beytra¨ge, § 2 in Russ [2004, p. 91.]
9Cf. Spaun [1805, pp. 4–5].
10Cf. Beytra¨ge, § 3, in Bolzano [1974, p. 4].
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logic included, would have to be considered as mathematical sciences; besides, no
consideration of the frequency of application could ever provide a definite distinction
between mathematical and non-mathematical sciences.
The concept of quantity is applicable to all objects, even to objects
of thought. Therefore if one wanted to consider the mere applica-
bility of the concept of quantity to an object a sufficient reason for
counting the theory of that object among the mathematical disci-
plines, all sciences would in fact have to count as mathematics, e.g.
even the science in which the proposition is proved that there are
only four (or as Platner more correctly states, only two) syllogistic
figures; or the science which states that there are no more and no
less than four sets of three pure simple concepts of the understand-
ing (categories), etc. Therefore in order to salvage this definition
one would have to take into account the difference between rarer
and more frequent applicability, i.e. count only those objects to be
in mathematics to which the concept of quantity can be applied
often and in many ways. But anyone can see that this would be
an extremely vague, and not at all scientific, determination of the
boundaries of the domain of mathematics. We must therefore look
for a better definition.11
After having shown that several definitions of mathematics based on its domain
of objects as quantities are inadequate, Bolzano turns to the analysis of Kant’s
suggestion, which is based on the opposition between philosophy and mathematics
and on the notion of an a priori intuition that grants the possibility of a construction
of mathematical concepts.
Bolzano’s criticism of Kant will be further discussed in § 3.5, but it must be noted
here that the argument given by Bolzano to reject the definition of mathematics
as a science of quantities is at the same time an argument against the Kantian
definition. Rejecting the traditional definition because the effect is mistaken for the
cause, Kant did not question the idea that mathematics concern only quantities.
On the contrary, he intended to give an explanation of the reason why mathematics
concern only quantities: quantities can be represented in space and time. So, the
form of mathematical knowledge is the reason why it concerns only quantities.12
11” Beytra¨ge, § 4 in Russ [2004, p. 92.]
12“Die philosophische Erkenntniß ist die Vernunfterkenntniß aus Begriffen, die mathematische aus
der Construction der Begriffe. Einen Begriff aber construiren, heißt: die ihm correspondirende
Anschauung a priori darstellen.” Kant (1787) KrV. B742-3. “Alles, was im Raum und in der Zeit
vorgestellt wird, hat extensive Gro¨ße.” Kant (1821), Vorlesungen u¨ber die Metaphysik (Po¨litz),
p. 53. “Die Form der mathematischen Erkenntniß ist die Ursache, daß diese lediglich auf Quanta
gehen kann.” Kant (1787) KrV. B742-3. “Da die Gro¨ße den Gegenstand der Mathematik aus-
macht, und in Betrachtung derselben nur darauf gesehen wird, wie vielmal etwas gesetzt sei, so
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In the Beytra¨ge, on the contrary, Bolzano rejects the definition of mathematics
as a science of quantities not only because the notion of quantity is too vaguely de-
fined, but also because he believes that, no matter how broad the notion of quantity
might be, mathematics would always concern objects that are definitely not quanti-
ties. Quantities are in fact considered as magnitudes (extensive or intensive) whose
properties can be fully described by numbers. Neither the notion of geometrical
point, nor the notion of a permutation can thus be included among quantities.
If we do not wish to move too far away from the use of language
(something which we should surely never do even in the sciences
without necessity), then we must understand by quantity, a whole
in so far as it consists of several equal parts, or even more generally,
something which can be determined by numbers.13
A similar argumentation is presented in the Gro¨ssenlehre, where Bolzano goes back
to the traditional definition of mathematics (see § 3.1). How is this possible? Firstly,
Bolzano applies a principle that he had already enunciated in the Beytra¨ge, and
that constitutes a leitmotif of his work: the linguistic usage is relevant and should
not be modified without necessity.
The traditional definition of mathematics that has been given up to
now does not say anything else than that mathematics is the science
of quantities (scientia quantorum). So I hope that my definition will
not be blamed for differing too much from the ordinary one.14
Secondly, Bolzano is still convinced that a science cannot be univocally character-
ized by its domain of objects—and thus even if mathematics is defined as a science
of quantities, this need not mean that it can be applied only to quantities.
However I have to explain that I did not keep the same expressions.
One should rightly say that mathematics is a theory of quantities,
leuchtet deutlich in die Augen, daß diese Erkenntniß auf wenigen und sehr klaren Grundlehren
der allgemeinen Gro¨ßenlehre (welches eigentlich die allgemeine Arithmetik ist) beruhen mu¨sse.”
Kant (1864), Untersuchung u¨ber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsa¨tze der natu¨rlichen Theologie und
der Moral, p. 282.
13Cf. also the following passage: “The concept of quantity, or of number, does not even appear
in many problems of the theory of combinations (this very important part of general mathesis).
For example, if the question is raised: which permutations—not how many—of the given things
a, b, c, . . . are admissible? In the particular parts of mathematics, chronometry, geometry
etc., as the names suggest, some object other than the concept of quantity (e.g. time, space, etc.)
appears everywhere, and the concept of quantity is just frequently applied to it. So that in all
these disciplines there are several axioms and theorems which do not even contain the concept
of quantity. Thus, for example, in chronometry the proposition that all moments are similar to
each other, and in geometry that all points are similar to each other, must be established. Such
propositions, which do not contain the concept of a quantity or number at all, could never be
established in mathematics if it were merely a science of quantity.” Cf. Beytra¨ge, I, § 3 in Russ
[2004, p. 92].
14Gro¨ssenlehre, Einleitung, § 2, Anm. in Bolzano [1975, p. 27].
BOLZANO VERSUS KANT: MATHEMATICS AS A SCIENTIA UNIVERSALIS 8
only if the objects that are considered in the different mathematical
sciences are quantities altogether and just because of the fact that
they are considered in those sciences. But that is not the case. On
the contrary, many mathematical sciences rather concern, at least
partially, objects that are not quantities, even if the concepts of
quantity and number are used to examine them.15
Thirdly, he assumes a different, and more general meaning of the word quantity, as
we will see in § 4. So, Bolzano reverts to the traditional definition of mathematics
because he wants to preserve a well-established, almost idiomatic expression, but at
the same time he changes its meaning by giving a different explanation of the con-
cept of quantity. The linguistic use, and the mathematical practice are maintained
but the usual way of speaking is combined with a conceptual change. Besides,
the reference to quantities that is suggested in the definition can be understood
on pragmatic grounds: it is useful to underline the propaedeutic function of the
general theory of quantities in mathematics.
So far, the evolution from the definition of mathematics as a theory of forms to
the traditional definition of mathematics as a science of quantities did not appear
as a radical change, but we will see in § 3 what further changes induced Bolzano to
abandon the definition of mathematics as a theory of forms.
2.2. Mathematics without intuitions: a truly conceptual science. A con-
stant feature of Bolzano’s anti-Kantianism is the refusal to grant intuitions any
role in mathematics: the latter is a merely conceptual science. In the Appendix to
Beytra¨ge, where Bolzano makes his critique to Kant, concepts and intuitions are
defined as following: “All ideas are either intuitions, i.e. ideas of an individual,
or concepts, i.e. ideas of something general.”16 Against Kant, Bolzano argues that
there is no such a thing as pure intuition: space and time are forms, but they are
concepts, just like smell and colour. He also argues that arithmetic does not require
the pure intuition of time in order to be universal and necessary knowledge, nor does
geometry require the pure intuition of space. Mathematics is a conceptual science,
that is to say, a science that contains just concepts. A non conceptual judgment is
on the contrary a judgment that contains at least an intuition. Mathematics does
not contain any intuition. Its objects are not individual but general.
The harsh criticism of Kant’s notion of an a priori intuition is due to Bolzano’s
strong belief that mathematics is a conceptual science. In the Beytra¨ge he explic-
itly defines it as a “a science which deals with the general laws (forms) to which
things must conform [sich richten nach] in their existence [Dasein]”, and adds that
15Gro¨ssenlehre, Einleitung, § 2, Anm. in Bolzano [1975, p. 27].
16Beytra¨ge, Appendix, § 2, in Russ [2004, p. 132.]
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“mathematics never deals with a single thing as an individual but always with whole
genera [Gattungen].”17 Having assumed the Kantian distinction between intuitions
as ideas of an individual and concepts as ideas of something general, there is no
doubt that mathematics, concerning only genera, is a conceptual science.
Bolzano wants to eliminate any appeal to intuition from mathematics. As a
mathematician he has to solve the problem of imaginary or ideal quantities, that
is to say, concepts that do not have a corresponding intuition in mathematics (the
infinite line, complicated spatial objects in stereometry, etc...). Bolzano does not
question their possibility, but grounds it on the independence from intuition and
imagination.
The proposition that every straight line can be extended to infinity
has no intuition behind it: the lines which our imagination can pic-
ture are not infinitely long. In stereometry we are often concerned
with such complicated spatial objects, that even the most lively
imagination is no longer able to imagine them clearly; but we none
the less continue to calculate with our concepts and find truth.18
2.3. Mathematics contains analytic and synthetic propositions. In the Bey-
tra¨ge Bolzano maintained the traditional Kantian definition of analyticity, and he
claimed that mathematics contains synthetic propositions (e.g. axioms) and an-
alytic propositions, which play the role of definitions. In the Wissenschaftslehre
Bolzano introduced a different definition of analyticity, but mathematics still con-
tains both analytic and synthetic propositions. Only their role is antithetic to the
role they played in Kant’s theory.
The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is introduced in the
Beytra¨ge with respect to judgments of the form <S is a kind of P>, which means
that S is a species of the genus P . If I can find a differentia specifica D so that S is
decomposable into P cum D, then the judgment is analytic: <P cum D is a kind
of P>. If I cannot find D, then I can only decompose S into P cum S, which is but
an apparent definition, and S is a simple concept. Bolzano mentions the following
examples: a) “A point is a spatial object” is a synthetic judgment, because it can
only be decomposed into “A spatial object which is a point is a spatial object”; b)
“Human are animals” on the contrary is analytic, because it can be decomposed
into: “An animal who is rational is an animal”.
A classification of judgements quite different from those considered
so far, which has, since Kant, become particularly important, is
17Beytra¨ge, § 8, in Russ [2004, p. 94.]
18Beytra¨ge, Appendix, § 9, in Russ [2004, p. 136.]
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the classification into analytic and synthetic judgements. In our so-
called necessity judgements, the subject appears as a species whose
genus is the predicate. But this relation of species to genus can be
of two kinds: either there is a characteristic which can be thought
of and stated in itself, which is added in thought as a differentia
specifica to the genus (predicate P) to produce the species (subject
S) or not. In the first case the judgement is called analytic; in every
other case, which may be any of the classes mentioned in § 15, it is
called synthetic.19
The Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is thus main-
tained: a judgment is called analytic if the predicate is contained directly, or indi-
rectly, in the definition of the subject; every other judgment is synthetic.20 Provided
that one does not consider synthetic judgments as based on any intuition, then one
might agree with Kant that the majority of propositions of arithmetic are synthetic.
The principle of sufficient reason, and the majority of propositions
of arithmetic are, according to Kant’s correct observation, synthetic
propositions.21
A new definition of analytic and synthetic propositions is presented by Bolzano in
the Wissenschaftslehre (especially § 148), where it is grounded on a new theory of
truth. Bolzano distinguishes between analyticity and logical analyticity: both are
associated to a proposition in itself, the objective counterpart of a sentence or of
a judgment. Each proposition in itself has a degree of validity (Gu¨ltigkeit) with
respect to some of its parts (representations in itself) that might be considered as
variables. The degree of validity of a proposition with respect to one or more of its
parts is expressed by the ratio of the number of true propositions and the number
of all (objectual) propositions that are obtained by variation of that part or those
parts of the proposition. A proposition is universally valid or invalid with respect
to those parts when the ratio is 1 or 0 respectively. A proposition is analytic if it
is universally valid or invalid with respect to at least one of its variable parts. A
proposition is logically analytic if it is universally valid or invalid with respect to all
its non logical parts. A proposition is synthetic if it is not analytic. Mathematical
truths are partly analytic, partly synthetic.
But suppose there is just a single [auch nur ein einziger] idea in it [in
a proposition] which can be arbitrarily varied without disturbing its
19Beytra¨ge, II §17 in Russ [2004, p. 115.]
20“In other words an analytic judgement is such that the predicate is contained directly, or indi-
rectly, in the definition of the subject, and every other one is synthetic.” Beytra¨ge, II §17 in Russ
[2004, p. 115.]
21Beytra¨ge, Appendix § 8 in Russ [2004, p. 135.]
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truth or falsity, i.e. if all the propositions produced by substituting
for this idea any other idea we pleased are either true altogether
or false altogether [...] I permit myself, then, to call propositions
of this kind, borrowing an expression from Kant, analytic. All the
rest, however, i.e. in which there is not a single idea that can
be arbitrarily varied without affecting their truth or falsity, I call
synthetic propositions.22
To conclude, Bolzano does not change his mind concerning the fact that mathemat-
ical treatises include both analytic and synthetic propositions, even if, as we will see
in § 3.4, the role of such propositions might vary according to a variation of their
respective definitions. Nor does he renounce the idea that mathematics is a truly
conceptual science, or that its domain includes other objects besides quantities.
3. Relevant changes between Beytra¨ge and Gro¨ssenlehre
3.1. Changing the definition of mathematics. A first undeniable difference
between the Beytra¨ge and the Gro¨ssenlehre concerns the definition of mathematics
itself. In the Beytra¨ge Bolzano criticized, as we have already mentioned in § 2.1,
the traditional definition of mathematics as a theory of quantities, and suggested
an alternative characterization as a theory of forms.
I therefore think that mathematics should best be defined as a science
which deals with the general laws (forms) to which things must conform
in their existence. By the word ‘things’ I understand here not merely
those which possess an objective existence independent of our conscious-
ness, but also those which simply exist in our imagination, either as in-
dividuals (i.e. intuitions) or simply as general concepts, in other words,
everything which can in general be an object of our capacity for repre-
sentation. Furthermore if I say that mathematics deals with the laws
to which these things conform in their existence, this indicates that our
science is concerned not with the proofs of the existence of these things
but only with the condition of their possibility.23
Some years later, in the unfinished work Gro¨ssenlehre he turned back to the tradi-
tional definition:
When one defines Mathematics as a science of quantities, and I ba-
sically turned back to such a definition, one undoubtedly assumes
22Wissenschaftslehre, § 148 in Bolzano [1837, vol. 1, p. 83]. For the criticism of Kant see also §
315 in Bolzano [1837, vol. 3, p. 246 ss.].
23Cf. Beytra¨ge, I, § 8, Russ [2004, p. 94])
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the word quantity in a broader meaning, because one certainly con-
siders the Theory of numbers as a mathematical discipline, and as
one of the most important disciplines.24
3.2. Abandoning the sharp distinction between mathematics and other
sciences. In the Gro¨ssenlehre the sharp distinction between mathematics and
other sciences that Bolzano had defended in the Beytra¨ge is considered as unattain-
able, or at least as incompatible with the usual linguistic practice of mathemati-
cians. And the latter ‘mathematical need’ has now become more important than
the ‘philosophical’ need for a foundation of science that might account for a sharp
disciplinary distinction.
“[...] a science deserves to be called mathematics if a considerable
part of its theory contains determinations of quantity whose cor-
rectness might be understood only on the basis of considerations
on the nature of magnitudes, considerations that require a proper
introduction. This addition will probably appear to many as ob-
jectionable, and so it appeared to me – I make no secret of it –
since it reduces the difference between mathematical sciences and
non mathematical sciences to a ‘more or less’ question. I do not
deny this might be a mischief, but I do not see how one could
avoid it, without determining the concept of mathematics in a way
that differs radically from the dominant linguistic use and that will
originate more confusion than advantages. [...] Anyway, this seems
to me to have been the rule followed by mathematicians, as they
increased the number of the mathematical sciences [...]25
This change is related to the overcome of the interest in foundational questions such
as demarcation, and in particular to the overcome of the urgency to give a definition
that is specular to the one given by Kant (see further § 3.5). By the way, it is to be
noted that these criteria are not only typical features of the Kantian conception of
mathematics, but also necessary conditions for a satisfactory definition of a scientific
discipline according to the standards that became widespread after the flourishing
of encyclopedias in the 18th century: a science is defined by its position in the tree
of knowledge. Besides, the opposition to philosophy was a standard way to account
for the difference in certainty, rigor and intersubjective agreement between the two
disciplines in the “geometric century”.26
24Gro¨ssenlehre, Einleitung, § 1 in Bolzano [1975, p. 25].
25Gro¨ssenlehre, Einleitung, §2, Anmerkung in Bolzano [1975, p. 29].
26For a characterization of the era between Spinoza and Kant as a “geometric century” see Basso
[2004].
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3.3. Mathematics does not concern the conditions of possibility of objects
that might come to existence. The definition of mathematics as a theory of
forms explained the opposition between philosophy and mathematics:
the former concerns itself with the question, how must things be
made in order that they should be possible? The latter raises the
question, which things are real—and indeed (because it is to be
answered a priori)—necessarily real? Or still more briefly, math-
ematics would deal with hypothetical necessity, metaphysics with
absolute necessity.27
Nonetheless the definition implied that mathematics, dealing with the conditions
of possibility of things, applies only to things that might become actual. This
definition of mathematics and philosophy is abandoned in the Gro¨ssenlehre because
the foundational problem of demarcation has become less urgent, since Bolzano
is more interested in giving an appropriate role to logic rather than in giving a
symmetric and opposite definition of philosophy and mathematics. But it is also
abandoned because Bolzano has developed, in the meantime, his logical theory of
ideas in themselves in the Wissenschaftslehre. If mathematics has to maintain the
same generality that it had in the Beytra¨ge, it should apply to all things, and thus
to ideas in themselves too, which are not and cannot become actual.
In the Beytra¨ge mathematics is a hypothetical science: it concerns the conditions
of the possible existence of objects—not only real objects, but also objects that exist
only in the imagination.
I therefore think that mathematics should best be defined as a sci-
ence which deals with the general laws (forms) to which things must
conform in their existence. By the word ‘things’ I understand here
not merely those which possess an objective existence independent
of our consciousness, but also those which simply exist in our imag-
ination, either as individuals (i.e. intuitions) or simply as general
concepts, in other words, everything which can in general be an
object of our capacity for representation. Furthermore if I say that
mathematics deals with the laws to which these things conform
in their existence, this indicates that our science is concerned not
with the proofs of the existence of these things but only with the
condition of their possibility.28
27Beytra¨ge, I. § 9, in Russ [2004, pp. 94–95.]
28Cf. Beytra¨ge, I, § 8, in Russ [2004, p. 94.]
BOLZANO VERSUS KANT: MATHEMATICS AS A SCIENTIA UNIVERSALIS 14
But from the Wissenschaftslehre onwards Bolzano developed a new theory of ideas
and propositions in themselves, and mathematics should concern such entities as
well. Bolzano explicitly admits that he has changed his mind.
More than thirty years ago I believed I could trace a more precise
boundary between mathematics and the other sciences, as I attrib-
uted to mathematics all those truths that do not concern the real
existence (Daseyn) but only the conditions for the possibility of ex-
istence. But I abandoned this thought as soon as I realized that
mathematical theories do not refer only to things that are real or
that might become real (i.e. to things that are possible).29
The change might appear less radical, if one takes into account a possible variation
in the notion of possibility itself, which could amount to mere conceivability in the
Beytra¨ge and to the possibility to become actual in the Gro¨ssenlehre.30
3.4. The different role played by analytic and synthetic judgements. As
already mentioned in § 2.3, the different definition of analyticity adopted in the
Wissenschaftslehre implies a different evaluation of the role of analytic and synthetic
judgements in scientific works, which in turn implies a further move against Kant.
The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is relevant to under-
stand their respective roles in mathematics. In the Beytra¨ge analytic judgments
cannot be considered as axioms, for they are composite and thus provable. They
are actually linguistic propositions rather than judgments, because they inform us
on different designations used to denote the objects rather than on the objects
themselves. Like Kant, Bolzano considers them as not ampliative, and therefore as
not properly deserving a place in a scientific system.
From this definition it now follows immediately that analytic judge-
ments can never be considered as axioms, indeed, in my opinion
they do not even deserve the name of judgements, but only that
of propositions, they teach us something new only as propositions,
i.e. insofar as they are expressed in words, but not as judgements.
In other words the new [fact] which one can learn from them never
concerns concepts and things in themselves but at most only their
designations. Therefore, they do not even deserve a place in a sci-
entific system, and if they are used, it is only to recall the concept
designated by a certain word, just as with conventions. In any case,
29Gro¨ssenlehre, Einleitung, § 2, Anmerkung in Bolzano [1975, p. 30].
30I thank Wolfgang Ku¨nne for this remark.
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it is decided even according to the usual view, that analytic judge-
ments are not axioms, for their truth is not recognized from them
themselves, but from the definition of the subject.31
Synthetic judgments are axioms for two reasons. On the one hand, because “there
are true definitions only for concepts which are composite, and therefore also de-
composable again,”32 that is to say only analytic propositions might play the role
of definitions. On the other hand, because axioms have to be unprovable and all
analytic propositions are provable.33 So, after having proved that there are some
synthetic judgments (e.g. judgments whose subject is a simple concept),34 Bolzano
argues that mathematics has axioms, because there are simple concepts that belong
properly to mathematics.
If the foregoing is correct, the question can now be answered, ‘whether
mathematics also has axioms?’. Of course, if all mathematical con-
cepts were definable concepts, then there could be no axioms in the
mathematical discipline. But since there are simple concepts which
belong properly to mathematics (§8), one certainly has to acknowl-
edge actual axioms in it. The domain of the axioms stretches as
far as that of the purely simple concepts: where the latter end and
the definitions begin, there also the axioms come to an end and the
theorems begin.35
As a consequence of the different definition of analyticity given in the Wissenschaft-
slehre (see § 2.3), mathematics still contains both analytic and synthetic truths, but
their role is quite different.
There are universal formulations of mathematical truths that are synthetic but
if one instantiates them, one obtains an analytic truth. For example, “The angles
of this triangle are together equal to two right angles” is analytic with respect to
‘this’. Similarly, “The angles of an equilateral triangle are together equal to two
right angles” is analytic with respect to ‘equilateral’. On the contrary,“The angles of
31Beytra¨ge, II § 18 in Russ [2004, p. 115.]
32Beytra¨ge, II § 18 in Russ [2004, p. 104.]
33“I believe I have found out that all judgements whose subject or predicate are composite concepts
must be provable judgements.” Beytra¨ge, II § 16 in Russ [2004, p. 114.] “Hence it now follows
that the really unprovable propositions, or axioms, are only to be sought in the class of those
judgements in which both subject and predicate are completely simple concepts.” Beytra¨ge, II §
20 in Russ [2004, p. 117.] “If therefore the word ‘axiom’ is to be taken in an objective sense we
must understand by it a truth which we not only do not know how to prove but which is in itself
unprovable.” Beytra¨ge, II § 11 in Russ [2004, p. 110.]
34“Therefore if all our judgements were analytic there could also be no unprovable judgements,
i.e. axioms at all. [...] we want to try and demonstrate, in a way independent of § 15, that there
actually are synthetic judgements. All judgements whose subject is a simple concept are thereby
already synthetic.” Beytra¨ge, II § 19 in Russ [2004, p. 116.]
35Beytra¨ge, II § 22 in Russ [2004, p. 119.]
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any triangle are together equal to two right angles” is synthetic, and the previously
mentioned truths are provable from this truth.36 This example looks paradoxical:
a universal proposition is considered to be synthetic, whereas if one instantiates it,
one obtains an analytic proposition. De Jong [1997] has suggested an interesting
interpretation: a Kantian example of a synthetic a priori proposition that was
considered to be grounded on intuition is transformed into an analytic proposition.
Bolzano’s criticism of Kant’s recourse to intuitions is here more radical, and it
explains why analytic truths deserve a place in a scientific system: given the fact
that they are not self-evident, some of them deserve not only a place but also a
proof in the system, e.g. a derivation from a general synthetic principle.
From these examples one can already derive that not every ana-
lytic proposition expresses a self-evident truth, and thus the aim of
teaching analytic propositions to somebody is not fully superfluous;
on the contrary it’s quite clear that even pure analytic propositions
are sometimes so remarkable that they not only deserve a place
in a textbook, but they make us feel obliged to guarantee their
truth with a proof. And indeed it cannot be denied that such ana-
lytic propositions, whose truth is not directly evident, can easily be
known as true, after one has learned a synthetic truth from which
they follow.37
3.5. A progressive distantiation from Kant. It is well known that the Kantian
definition of mathematics as the“knowledge gained by reason from the construction
of concepts” has been extremely influential in the early 19th century, and that
Bolzano was among its harsher critics. As a matter of fact, Bolzano’s criticism of
Kant is one of the most coherent features of his epistemology: if the Betrachtungen
apparently accept several Kantian remarks on geometry, from the Beytra¨ge onwards
Bolzano never stops criticizing Kant’s notion of a priori intuition, Kant’s claim that
mathematics contains propositions based on an a priori intuition of space and time,
and the kind of distinction he introduces between philosophy and mathematics.
These issues, briefly mentioned in the Beytra¨ge (§ 9), in the Gro¨ssenlehre and in
the Paradoxes of the Infinite—where Kant’s “idea of space as a (subjective) form of
intuition” is referred to as an unfortunate idea38—are extensively discussed in the
Appendix to the Beytra¨ge,39 in the Wissenschaftslehre, in Athanasia, and of course
36Cf. Wissenschaftslehre, § 197 in Bolzano [1837, vol. 2, p. 333 ss.].
37Wissenschaftslehre, § 447 in Bolzano [1837, vol. 4, p. 116].
38“until finally Kant got the unfortunate idea, still repeated by many today, of considering space
as well as time not to be something objective, but to be a mere (subjective) form of our intuition.”
Cf. Russ [2004, p. 646.]
39“The critical philosophy seems to promise us one [a better definition] [...] mathematics is a
science of the construction of concepts (A712). [...] For my part I wish to admit openly that I have
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in Prihonsky’s Neuer Anti-Kant.40 But Bolzano’s anti-Kantianism underwent a
significant evolution.
In the Beytra¨ge the need to criticize Kant dictates Bolzano’s agenda. His main
aim is apparently that of deconstructing Kant’s definition point by point. Where
Kant speaks of intuition, Bolzano speaks of pure concepts; where Kant speaks of
quantities, Bolzano speaks of forms; if Kant ignores logic, Bolzano develops it in de-
tails as part of an analysis of the notion of a mathematical proof. Besides, Bolzano’s
terminology is Kantian, because Bolzano adopts Kant’s definition of intuition, con-
cept, analytic, synthetic, etc. Thirdly, Bolzano himself makes a connection between
the need of a new definition and Kant’s criticism quoting the review of a work by
Vieth (cf. § 4).41 Finally, like Kant, Bolzano’s characterization of mathematics is
developed by opposition to philosophy, and in order to explain why mathematics
applies to a certain domain of objects, and thus how it can be sharply distinguished
from other sciences.
From the Wissenschaftslehre onwards a new logical theory and new definitions of
the main concepts are introduced. I claim that this corresponds to a radicalization
of the opposition to Kant, or at least to a form of opposition that is no more
internal but rather external to the Kantian framework, because the return to the
traditional definition of mathematics as a science of quantities was the only further
anti-Kantian assumption that Bolzano could make.
To summarize, the changes in the conception of mathematics are due to changes
in Bolzano’s logic: the new theory of truth involves a different definition of analytic
and synthetic judgments, and the introduction of ideas in themselves involves a
different conception of mathematical entities. But they can also be related to a
gradual overcome of Kant’s terminology (e.g the definition of analyticity, but also
the renouncement to define mathematics by opposition to philosophy), and to a
radicalization of Bolzano’s anti-Kantianism (e.g. the different interpretation of the
role of analytic and synthetic truths in mathematics, but also the return to the
traditional definition that Kant had explicitly criticized).
not yet been able to convince myself of the truth of many doctrines in the critical philosophy, and
especially of the correctness of the Kantian claims about pure intuitions and about the construction
of concepts using them. I still believe that in the concept of a pure (i.e. a priori) intuition
there already lies an intrinsic contradiction. Much less can I persuade myself that the concept
of number must necessarily be constructed in time and that consequently the intuition of time
belongs essentially to arithmetic.” Beytra¨ge, Appendix, §§ 5-6 in Russ [2004, p. 93.]
40Concerning the distinction between philosophy and mathematics see in particular pp. 216-17,
repr. in Prihonsky [2003, pp. 172-173].
41Beytra¨ge, I, § 7, in Russ [2004, p. 93].
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4. Enlarging the notion of quantity
It is well known that in the Beytra¨ge Bolzano criticizes the definition of mathe-
matics as a science of quantities saying that no matter how one defines quantities,
the domain of mathematics will never correspond exactly to the domain of quan-
tities. More generally, one could say that however one defines a class of objects,
the domain of mathematics will never coincide exactly with it. So, better define
mathematics as a science of forms rather than as a science of those objects which
are called quantities.
Another interesting quotation in § 7 of the Beytra¨ge, whose author is here identi-
fied for the first time,42 comes from a review of Anfangsgru¨nde der Mathematik by
Gerhard Ulrich Vieth [1805] published in the Neue Leipziger Literaturzeitung.43 In
the review Leibniz is explicitly mentioned, and quantity is defined “as the object of
mathematics only because it is the most general finite form”, so that mathematics
is by nature a general theory of forms. Bolzano remarks that he has
included in the first books of his Miscellanea Mixta, just before
he started his Miscellanea Mathematica, some reviews and even
mathematical texts. Here is a list of them. [....] In Notebook III
(towards the end) Vieth’s Anfangsgru¨nde der Mathematik.44
Vieth’s book is quoted several times by Bolzano, for example in Miscellanea mathe-
matica (1814),45 where it is analyzed in details, or in Erste Begriffe der allegemeinen
Gro¨ssenlehre (1816),46 where Bolzano discusses Vieth’s concept of a negative quan-
tity, which is defined as a quantity that decreases some other quantity, or again in
the Gro¨ssenlehre. On the notion of quantity Bolzano declares that Vieth shares
the same conception as Ka¨stner, i.e. that quantity is something that increases
[vermehren] and decreases [vermindern].47
42For further details see Cantu` [forthcoming].
43Bolzano actually quotes the right number of the review, but mentions the name of the previous
series: Leipziger Literaturzeitung. The quotation can be found in Neue Leipziger Literaturzeitung,
July 1808, section 81, pp. 1288–1294 Cf. Anonymous [1808].
44“In den Miscellaneis mixtins, in den ersteren Heften habe ich, bevor ich noch einige Hefte wie
diese fu¨r Mathematik hatte, Recensionen, auch mathematische Schriften eingetragen. Hier folgt
ein Verzeichniss derselben. [...] Im Heft III (gegen Ende) Vieths Anfangsgru¨nde der Mathematik)”
Bolzano [2000, p. 146].
45Bolzano [1990, pp. 106 ff.].
46Bolzano [1977, p. 276].
47As a traditional definition he mentions the one by Hausen, Ka¨stner, Horvath, Vieth, Voigt,
Rothe, Kraushaar, Crelle, ecc. As already mentioned in § 2.1, the definition goes back to Wolff.
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In the review mentioned by Bolzano in the Beytra¨ge, the author criticizes the
Kantian definition of mathematics, and expecially the idea that mathematics con-
cerns only quantities that can be represented in space and time.48Against the tra-
ditional definition of quantity as something that increases or decreases the reviewer
introduces a more general notion of quantity as the most general form of finitude.49
It should be noted that when Bolzano goes back to the definition of mathematics
several years later, something has changed in between. On the one hand he has
introduced a different definition of quantity, which can be found already in the
Miscellanea Mathematica. Quantity is a
species of things, between any two of those we can assert one and
just one of the following reciprocal relations: either they are equal
one to the other or one contains a part that is equal to the other.50
This notion of quantity makes no reference to decomponibility in equal parts or
to measurability, as Bolzano himself explains in U¨ber den Begriff der Gro¨ße und
die verschiedenen Arten derselben (1816). After having introduced the concepts of
number [Zahl], relation [Verha¨ltniss], and set [Menge], Bolzano presents the follow-
ing definition of quantity [Gro¨ße]:
Each quality of an object has a quantity, if this quality can be
considered as a set of parts in such a way that for any two things
one of them contains something that is equal to the other, that is
to say, these two things either are equal or in one of them there is
as a part something that is equal to the other. And this property
itself is called the quantity (quantitas) of the thing.51
48“Aber die Mathematik bezieht sich weder allein auf Dinge, die sich in Zeit und Raum darstellen
lassen, noch auch werden die Dinge, die sich in Zeit und Raum darstellen lassen, in der Math-
eamtilk allein in so fern betrachtet, als sie Gro¨ssen sind, weil sie acuh der Gestalt und Art nach
construirt werden; z.B. + und -, commensurabel und incommensurabel, gerade und krumm, gleich-
fo¨rmig und ungleichfo¨rmig, stetig und discret, sind doch wohl mathematische Begrtiffe? Dennoch
aber haben sie mit Gro¨sse nichts zu thun.” Anonymous [1808, p. 1291].
49“Die Gro¨sse ist nur darum Gegenstand der Mathematik, weil sie die allgemeinste Form ist,
endlich zu seyn, die Mathematik aber ihrer Natur nach eine allgemeine Formenlehre ist; und
zwar Arithmetik insofern sie die Gro¨sse als die allgemeine Form endlicher Dinge, Goemetrie,
insofern sie den Raum als die allgemeine Form der Natur, Zeitlehre, insofern sie die allgemeine
Form der Kra¨fte, Bewegungslehre, insofern sie die allgemeine Form der im Raume wirkenden
Kra¨fte betrachtet, und alle diese Formen in ihren innern, weitern Beschra¨nkungen, ausbildet.”
Anonymous [1808, p. 1291].
50Gro¨ssenlehre, Einleitung, § 1, in Bolzano [1975, pp. 25–6].
51“Jede Beschaffenheit einer Sache hat eine Gro¨ße, wenn sich diese Beschaffenheit betrachten
la¨ßt als eine Menge von Theilen der Art, daß von je zweyen der eine allemahl in dem andern
gleichkommendes Ding in sich faßt, d.h. daß diese zwey Theile entweder einander gleich kommen,
oder daß in dem einen ein dem andern gleich kommendes Ding als Theil vohanden ist. Und diese
Eigenschaft selbst heißt man die Großheit (quantitas) des Dinges.” U¨ber den Begriff der Gro¨ße
und die verschiedenen Arten derselben, § 9, in Bolzano [1977, p. 195].
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Bolzano distinguishes between decomponibility in equal parts (which is not nec-
essary) and the condition of being equal or unequal with respect to some other
quantity (which is necessary). And the latter condition does not yet amount to
measurability. Bolzano also clarifies that not all quantities are measurable, but just
those for which one can determine a measure unit and a rule to determine how
many equal parts of the measure unit are contained in the given quantity.52
In the Introduction to the Einleitung zur Gro¨ssenlehre, Bolzano adds a note, and
then cancels it, on pure mathematics, which is defined as the science of quantities in
abstracto, i.e. considered independently from the genus quantities belong to (geo-
metrical quantities, mechanical quanties, and so on). Combining the new definition
of quantity with the idea of a mathesis universalis, Bolzano applies mathematics
to any kind of quantity, even abstract and non measurable quantities. In the same
text he introduces the following definition:
I believe that the best thing to do would be to distinguish two
meanings of the word ‘quantity’ [Gro¨sse], a broader and a narrower
meaning. In a narrower sense one could understand by quantity
what one usually calls continuous quantities; in a broader sense
one could take the word to include both the continuous and the
so-called non continuous or discrete magnitudes, and nothing else.
[...] It is in this broader sense, I think, that we call any object a
quantity (quantum), when we consider it as belonging to a species
of things, between any two of those we can assert one and just one
of the following reciprocal relations: either they are equal one to
the other or one contains a part that is equal to the other.53
5. Conclusion: mathematics as a mathesis universalis
The analysis of Bolzano’s changes in the definition of mathematics has shown
that they are less radical than one might think. Several issues are common to the
three works: 1) the definition of mathematics does not depend on its objects; 2)
mathematics is exclusively conceptual; 3) its propositions are partly analytic and
partly synthetic; 4) its objects are not just numbers, concrete continuous magni-
tudes, or magnitudes that can be measured. Notwithstanding those similarities,
there are relevant issues that change in the three works: 1) mathematical objects
are possible entities in 1810 but in 1837 and in 1848 they are conceived also as ideas
in themselves, which cannot be possible, because they can never become actual; 2)
52U¨ber den Begriff der Gro¨ße und die verschiedenen Arten derselben, §§ 11-12, in Bolzano [1977,
p. 196]. This definition radically differs from the one presented in the manuscript on Mathesis
universalis (1810), where measurability is still considered as an essential feature of quantities. Cf.
Bolzano [1976] and the French translation by Maigne´ and Sebestik [2010].
53Gro¨ssenlehre, Einleitung, § 1, in Bolzano [1975, pp. 25–26].
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mathematics is defined as a theory of forms in the Beytra¨ge and as a science of
quantities in the Gro¨ssenlehre; 3) mathematics is defined by opposition to philoso-
phy and to other scientific disciplines in the Beytra¨ge but not in the Gro¨ssenlehre;
4) in the Beytra¨ge Bolzano remarks that analytic truths should not occur in a sci-
entific treatment, given that they are only conventions used to recall the concept
designated by a certain word, but in the Wissenschaftslehre analytic truths are con-
sidered as relevant enough to deserve a place in a scientific system, and sometimes
even a proof; 5) Bolzano’s anti-Kantianism evolves from 1810 to 1848.
Given the elements of continuity and the elements of discontinuity that we have
described in the previous paragraphs, it is now possible to evaluate the coherence
of Bolzano’s evolution. Bolzano clearly renounced the aim that he had praised in
1810—the idea of a sharp distinction between mathematics and other sciences—
in favor of a more fluid and pragmatic classification of knowledge, but he always
believed that mathematics cannot be adequately described by the indication of
its domain of objects, and that mathematics does not concern only quantities,
even if it is based on a quantitative approach to objects. Most differences concern
minor points, or are perfectly understandable in the light of new definitions of the
concepts involved. But what about the fundamental difference between forms that
are possible and ideas or propositions in themselves that are not?
The difference is the result of Bolzano’s continuous effort to defend the possibility
of applying mathematical principles and theorems to the largest possible domain
of objects. In the Gro¨ssenlehre Bolzano considers arithmetic and combinatorics as
general sciences that can be applied to almost all kinds of things, and thus also
to non actual objects. This is true of arithmetic, because numbers are not real
objects, but just determinations of objects that can be used to determine all other
quantities.54 And it is true of combinatorics, because the latter can be applied to
any object that can be part of a whole.55 Bolzano’s conception of mathematics as a
general mathesis—first presented in 1810—has not disappeared in the Gro¨ssenlehre.
It is exactly for the sake of generality that Bolzano abandons the previous definition
of mathematics and modifies the meaning of ‘Gro¨sse’ from quantity to quantity in
general, as it was common in the tradition of the mathesis universalis.56
54“Eine besondere Gattung von Gro¨ssen, welche sich unsrer Betrachtung vor andern darbieten,
deren wir uns eben desshalb u. ihrer Einfachheit wegen zur genauern Bestimmung aller u¨brigen
Gro¨ssen bedienen, sind — die Zahlen.” Gro¨ssenlehre, Einleitung, § 3.5, in Bolzano [1975, p. 34].
55“Denn sicher ist doch das Gebiet der Gegensta¨nde, auf welche sich diese Gegensta¨nde in irgend
einem Betrachte als Theile vorstellte, die in ein eigenes Ganze vereinigt werden sollen, und dass
diese Vereinigung einem Gesetze von der Art unterliege, dass es bei einer endlichen Menge von
ihnen nur eine endliche Menge Verbindungen gibt.” Gro¨ssenlehre, Einleitung, § 3.4, in Bolzano
[1975, p. 36].
56On the characterization of quantities in the Gro¨ssenlehre see especially Sebestik [1992, p. 342].
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Bolzano’s change in the definition of mathematics is thus a consequence of a
deeper understanding of the meaning and the nature of the general mathesis.
Bolzano’s evolution is thus coherent. Rather than a change in his conception of
mathematics, it is the result of a change in his logical and epistemological theory,
and can be better understood in the light of an increased distance from the Kantian
framework.
While Bolzano was still pervasively influenced by Kant in the Beytra¨ge, so that
Bolzano felt the need to present a definition of mathematics that should have the
same advantages and characteristics of the Kantian definition, even if by opposition,
his anti-Kantianism becomes much more radical as a consequence of the introduc-
tion of a new logical perspective. At this point, he does not need to produce a
point by point counter-argumentation of Kant’s theses: in particular, there is no
more need for a definition of mathematics that might guarantee a sharp distinction
between mathematics and other sciences, or explain the certainty of mathematics
by opposition to philosophy. Bolzano’s adhesion to the project of a mathesis univer-
salis and his resistance to any bipartition of mathematics in theory of numbers and
theory of magnitudes—numbers are themselves a kind of quantity—are coherent
with his anti-Kantian conception of mathematics.
The idea of mathematics as being the science of quantities in general is the conti-
nuity element in Bolzano’s evolution, which can be appreciated only if one develops
a deep analysis of Bolzano’s notion of quantity and of the changes it underwent
with time. According to this interpretation, the conception of mathematics remains
substantially unaltered, but Bolzano’s investigation on the foundations of mathe-
matics moves from a philosophical perspective that is still profoundly indebted to
Kant’s terminology and to Kant’s definitional criteria towards a mathematical and
algebraic conception which is much more concerned with a precise clarification of
the primitive concepts of the discipline. It is exactly for this reason that Bolzano
goes back to the traditional definition of mathematics: the linguistic use can be
preserved, provided that one preliminarily clarifies the meaning of the concepts
involved.
According to this interpretation, Bolzano’s change in the definition of mathe-
matics depends on a change in the logic (the introduction of ideas and propositions
in themselves), which is, as I have shown elsewhere,57 strictly connected to the
solution of certain mathematical needs (e.g. the need to explain how mathematics
might contain meaningful propositions concerning objectless ideas). The belief in
57Cf. Cantu` [2006] and Cantu` [2003a]. Both papers are extracted from the dissertation Objectless
ideas in the Wissenschaftslehre of B. Bolzano discussed in 2001 at the University of Gene`ve (M.A.
Philosophy and History of Logic) under the supervision of Kevin Mulligan, to whom I am deeply
indebted for having introduced me to the study of Bolzano’s works.
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the importance of logic for mathematics is probably the main reason for the radi-
calization of Bolzano’s anti-Kantianism, and is coherently reflected in the evolution
of his definition of mathematics. Bolzano’s return to the traditional definition is
the best compromise he could find in order to keep together the new logical theory
with the idea of a mathesis universalis.
I have claimed in previous work that the need to legitimate the meaningfulness of
certain contradictory ideas in mathematics was one of the reasons for Bolzano’s de-
velopement of a theory of objectless ideas, which I interpreted by a comparison with
Leibniz’s notions of cogitatio possibilis and chimaera in the New Essays. Something
similar can be claimed in the case of the definition of mathematics: the need to
legitimate the use of imaginary quantities in mathematics was one of the reasons for
Bolzano’s return to an old definition which still expresses the conception of mathe-
matics as a scientia universalis. A comparison with Leibniz is indirectly suggested
by Bolzano himself in the Beytra¨ge, even if the name of Leibniz is mentioned just
once (or rather the Leibniz-Wolff school is mentioned), and in a slightly different
context (in the second section of the Beytra¨ge, § 1, concerning the generality of
the mathematical method which can be used in the presentation of any science), as
Bolzano recalls the review of the book by Vieth, where Leibniz is praised for being,
unlike Kant, mathematician and philosopher at the same time.58
To conclude, my general claim is that both the introduction of a new definition
in the Beytra¨ge and the return to the traditional definition of mathematics in the
Gro¨ssenlehre can be interpreted as a change in terminology but not as a radical
change in Bolzano’s conception of mathematics. The change of definition is a co-
herent development of two fundamental ideas of Bolzano: 1) Kant’s conception of
mathematics is inadequate, and 2) mathematics is a scientia universalis. Changes
are the result of the fact that Bolzano dinstanced himself more and more from
Kant’s perspective – because he developed a new logic as a result of certain urgent
mathematical needs – and also from the traditional habit to define mathematics
by opposition to other sciences, especially philosophy, as it was mostly the case in
18th century encyclopedias and dictionaries.
In other words, both definitions of mathematics (as a theory of forms and as a
theory of quantities) are opposed to Kant’s definition, and the second more than
the first. Besides, as we will argue in the conclusion, both definitions arise from
Bolzano’s understanding of mathematics as a universal mathesis, but the second is
based on a different notion of quantity (§ 4). In both cases we will interpret the
58“Wir wissen es wohl, diese Definitionen ru¨hren von einem beru¨hmten Philosophen her; der aber
zugleich ha¨tte Mathematiker seyn mu¨ssen, wie Leibnitz, wenn er mit Erfolg die mathematischen
Grundbegriffe ha¨tte bestimmen sollen.” Anonymous [1808, p. 1291].
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change as due to Bolzano’s urgence to solve a specific mathematical problem: the
question of contradictory concepts (§ 5).
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